With Whose Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy by Becker, Craig
With Whose Hands: Privatization, Public
Employment, and Democracy
Craig Becker*
Privatization is the public sector analogue of the "runaway shop."
In the private sector, the increasing mobility of capital has spawned
unprecedented forms of labor discipline by allowing firms to trans-
fer operations between states and even to foreign countries. Priva-
tization-diverting work from the public to the private sector-
serves a similar purpose. Both privatization and capital flight enable
employers to continue providing services or producing products
while shedding a web of existing obligations to their employees. In
the public sector, however, the rights of labor are coextensive with
legislative and constitutional guarantees of fair, open, and vigorous
government. The trend toward privatization amounts to a deliber-
ate effort to evade the rules and procedures intrinsic to democratic
government.
This Article opens by arguing that privatization is not a coherent
social policy but instead a labor relations strategy designed to cut
labor costs by circumventing the rights of public employees. Exam-
ining the links between the rights of civil servants and democratic
government, it demonstrates that principles of openness, merit, and
independence, which are enunciated in civil service laws and also
guaranteed by the Constitution, are essential to the administration
of a democratic state. By annulling the rights of public employees,
the Article concludes, privatization may give rise to a more tractable
workforce, but one ill-suited to carrying out public policy in a
democracy.
L Privatization As Labor Discipline
Privatization is fundamentally a labor policy: an overt challenge
to public employment defended in the language of efficiency.
Whether its proponents marshal cost-benefit statistics or speak of
utility-maximization, privatization merely substitutes one set of
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hands for another. This substitution has profound implications. It
removes the relationship of employer and employee from one
sphere of regulation, consisting of civil service laws and constitu-
tional restraints, and places it within another, governed by the rules
of the marketplace, as well as the provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act' and other statutes applying to private employment.
Those who endorse privatization discount the right of private em-
ployees to organize, bargain collectively, and strike. Public employ-
ees, in contrast, have a constitutional right to organize;2 yet only 26
states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation provid-
ing for collective bargaining. 3 And only nine states have affirma-
tively granted their employees a right to strike. 4 The underlying
presumption of arguments for privatization is that workers in the
private sector will remain unorganized. 5 In the public sector, how-
ever, the prerogatives of workers are not achieved solely by organiz-
ing and collective bargaining. To the contrary, their peculiar rights
in the workplace-which privatization is designed to eliminate-at-
tach to their status as government employees.
In 1977, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that privatization "represent[s] a choice among alternative social or
political goals or values." 6 The case concerned the duty of a school
district to bargain with its employees about the contracting-out of
food services. The court found that "the policies and functions of
the district are unaffected by the decision .... The same work will be
performed in the same places in the same manner." 7 In the court's
opinion, the principal consequence of privatization is that it "substi-
.tute[s] private employees for public employees." 8 Although the
school district contended that contracting-out work was a question
of public policy committed to the exclusive discretion of the state,
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq (1982).
2. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465
(1979).
3. Public Employee Dep't, AFL-CIO, One Country . . . Two Different Worlds 1
(1987).
4. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1611, 1703
(1984). See also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.14 (D)(2) (Anderson 1987 Supp.); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 48, 1617 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
5. This assumption is firmly based on recent experience. Between 1956 and 1978,
union membership grew only 1% among private employees while expanding 296%
among public workers. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, supra note 4, at
1615.
6. Unified School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 259 N.W.2d
724, 732 (Wisc. 1977).
7. 259 N.W.2d at 732.
8. 259 N.W.2d at 732.
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the court held that contracting-out primarily affected the terms and
conditions of employment and therefore fell within the purview of
collective bargaining.
Few public employers or advocates of privatization have fully ex-
plicated its significance for labor relations in the public sector.
However, in The Unions and the Cities, which remains the most articu-
late and far-reaching critique of collective bargaining in the public
sector, Professor Harry Wellington and Judge Ralph Winter ex-
pressly recognize that privatization constitutes a fundamental re-
straint on the power of organized labor in the public sector.9
Wellington and Winter underscore "the value of interposing a
private employer."' 1  While acknowledging that "[i]n no circum-
stances will government shed its labor problems by shedding func-
tions,"'' they nevertheless assert that "contracting out, all other
things being equal, is preferable to retaining a function that has
been unionized."' 2 In their view, privatization effectively counters
the disproportionate power that organized labor allegedly exerts in
the public sector.
In several instances, public employers have contracted-out serv-
ices with clear anti-union animus.' 3 In 1977, for example, janitors
at Mt. Anthony Union High School in Vermont began to organize.
The local school board had considered, but rejected, the idea of
contracting for custodial services just two years earlier. But once
the "union sought recognition," the Vermont Supreme Court
found, "the idea was quickly . . . put into effect."' 14 The school
board, moreover, abandoned its prior position that a 60-day trial
contract was necessary and instead let the contract for a full year.
The contract began in the middle of the school year and five of six
employees known to be involved in the organizing activity were dis-
charged.' 5 The Vermont Labor Relations Board found this action
to be an unfair labor practice "inherently destructive" of employee
rights and ordered the employees reinstated.' 6
Most who advocate privatization, however, have neither stated its
labor relations objectives as starkly as Wellington and Winter nor
acted with the heavy hand of the Mt. Anthony School Board. None-
9. H. Wellington & R. Winter, The Unions and the Cities 62-65 (197 1).
10. Id. at 62 (capitalization and italicization deleted).
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 62.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 21-25.
14. In re Southwestern Vermont Educ. Ass'n, 396 A.2d 123, 125 (Vt. 1978).
15. 396 A.2d at 125.
16. 396 A.2d at 124.
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theless, the standard rationales for privatization-improving effi-
ciency and eliminating red tape-reduce to cutting labor costs.
These rationales counterpose "efficiency" and "bureaucracy,"
which is portrayed as the dreaded bogey of public administration.
"Government is inherently wasteful," contends Donald Hutto, the
vice-president of Corrections Corporation of America, the nation's
largest private provider of custodial services. "Every time you want
something, you have to go through a complex political process."' 7
Figuring out from whose pocket the savings from privatization
will be clipped is not a complex calculation. Like all service indus-
tries, government is labor intensive. Collecting garbage, guarding
prisoners, dispensing welfare, cleaning, shelving, filing, and most
other governmental functions require the work of many hands. Per-
sonnel costs in state and local governments account for 70-90% of
total expenditures.' 8 Any substantial savings from providing gov-
ernment services privately will necessarily result from reducing la-
bor costs.
In 1984, for example, National Medical Enterprises contracted
with St. Louis, Missouri, to manage the city's hospital and clinics.
The private operator promptly discharged the entire workforce to
eliminate all accrued benefits, cut jobs, and break the union. '9 In
other cities, National Medical Enterprises has cut the percentage of
registered nurses on staff from 40% to 25% and replaced them with
lower-paid aides and other unlicensed personnel.2t '
Threats of privatization also have been used to exact concessions
from public employees. Louis A. Witzeman, chairman of the board
of the private fire-fighting company, Rural Metro Fire )epartment,
complains, -[I]f I had a dollar for every time somebody in city hall
put out a bid or started talking about private fire services and strung
me down the primrose path while all he was really doing was trying
17. Krajick, Prisons for Profit: The Private Alternative, State Legislatures 9. II (Apr.
1984).
18. Staudohar, Subcontracting in State and Local Government Employment, 9.1.
Collective Negotiations 245, 245 (1980). See also D. Stanley, Managing Local Govern-
ment Under Local Union Pressure 120 (1972) (labor costs 60-70% of citv budgets);
Simon, The School Finance Decision: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Deci-
sions, 82 Yale LJ. 409, 413 (1973) (salaries and fringe benefits are 65% of school
expenditures).
19. Abramovitz, Privatizing Health Care: The Bottom Line is Society L.oses, The
Nation, Oct. 17, 1987, at 410, 411.
20. Id. Similarly, private security guards-representing one of the main labor pools
from which private prisons presumably would draw their employees-are paid 15% less
than public prison guards, and private guards are less likely to be high school graduates,
to work full time and year round, and to be of prime working age. J. Donahue, Prisons
for Profit 15 (1988).
Yale Law & Policy Review
to whip his union, I would be a wealthy man." 2' George Latimer,
mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota, put the issue bluntly, "Private con-
tracts act as good discipline on our own operations.- 22 In Newark,
New Jersey, one-third of the city's sanitation services were con-
tracted-out to a private firm. "It's amazing what a little competition
will do," noted Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson, while also adding that he
planned to increase the private share of sanitation work to two-
thirds.2 3  One study found that from 1965-68 management
threatened to contract-out during 16 local government strikes and
that the threats were implemented to end five of the disputes. 24
President of the National Treasury Employees Union, Robert M.
Tobias, charges that the federal policy of relying on private provid-
ers is "being used not as a management tool to make reasoned, pru-
dent judgments in the process of governing but as a political club to
bludgeon the Federal Government workforce. ' '2 5
As well as cutting costs, its advocates argue, privatization circum-
vents cumbersome public regulations. As a procurement specialist
with the General Services Administration contends, "the contractor
has a flexibility that the government does not have to do the job."-26
Central to the regulations governing public administration, how-
ever, is a set of carefully constructed civil service laws that guarantee
employee selection and advancement in accordance with merit and
also protect public workers from arbitrary and oppressive treatment.
Civil service rules govern the entire range of personnel practices,
including hiring and promotion, as well as detail, discipline, and dis-
charge. These rules have been harshly attacked in the President's
Private Sector on Cost Control's Report on Privatization, and evading
them has been a major catalyst in the trend toward privatization.
"[G]overnmental-run operations," the President's Report finds,
"are constrained by regulated 'safeguards' that inhibit a manager's
freedom to manage, such as Civil Service regulations governing per-
sonnel pay and dismissal." 27 It is precisely such "inefficient Govern-
21. Public Services and the Private Alternative, Gov't Union Rev. 44 (special ed.
1982).
22. Tolchin, More Cities Paying Industry to Provide Public Services, N.Y. Times,
May 28, 1985, at A1, col. 1.
23. Id. at Dl7, col 4.
24. Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees,
79 Yale LJ. 418, 440 (1970).
25. Oversight Hearing on Circular A-76 Shows Controversy Continues Over Con-
tracting Out, 22 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1810, 1811 (Sept. 24, 1984).
26. Struck, I, 800 U.S. Workers May Lose Their Jobs to Private Industry, Wash.
Post., Sept. 28, 1983, at C7, col. 5.
27. President's Private Sector on Cost Control, Report on Privatization 1 (1983).
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ment policies and practices," the Report suggests, that could be
"corrected via privatization. '
-
2 8
I. Rights of Labor and Democracy
Political and legal restraints on government administrators can be
labelled inefficient only by equating the purpose of public adminis-
tration with that of private business. Indeed, this is the key premise
underlying arguments for privatization: The state should function
like any corporation, and the laws of the market should prevail in
government administration. Governed by these principles, private
companies have moved from providing services at the periphery of
government, which may be characterized as commercial, to assum-
ing core public functions.2 9
The gradual privatization of corrections exemplifies this trend.
Private firms initially assumed merely ancillary functions within pub-
lfic prisons, ranging from job training to meal preparation; 39 states
*and the District of Columbia currently contract for such services. 30
Simultaneously, the private prison business developed in institu-
ions where the lines between punishment and care, deviance and
dependence are blurred; hundreds of halfway houses for prisoners
are now managed by private groups. According to the Justice De-
partment, six states have contracted with private firms to operate
juvenile detention facilities. 3 ' Expanding the reach of their author-
ity, private operators just recently have begun to exercise the sover-
eign power of punishment. The federal government spends $21
million a year to house 3,200 inmates, largely illegal aliens, in 300
private institutions.3 2 And approximately 1,200 adult citizens now
are held in secure correctional facilities run by private jailers. 33
Advocates of privatization affirm the universality of management
principles developed in the private sector. According to John King,
28. Id. Dissenting in In re Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO, Justice Daniel J. O'Hern
made a point of noting that "troublesome efforts to comply with the rules and regula-
tions of the Civil Service Commission may encourage some to seek alternative means to
deliver state services." 443 A.2d 187, 207 (O'Hern,J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
29. For a discussion of the standards the federal government uses to identify core
functions, see infra Tingle, Privatization and the Reagan Administration: Ideology and
Application, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 228, 232-33 (1988).
30. Becker & Stanley, Incarceration Inc. The Downside of Private Prisons. The Na-
tion, June 15, 1985, 728, 728.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. National Inst. of Justice, Contracting for the Operation of Prisons and Jails 3
(Apr. 1987).
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former secretary of the Louisiana Department of Corrections and a
strong supporter of commercial convict labor, "the principles of
management are the same whether you're making chocolate chip
cookies or incarcerating people. ' '3 4 E.S. Savas, a former member of
the Reagan administration, 35 argues that government should with-
draw from providing child care and predicts that private enterprises
will meet the need. He speculates hopefully that "one can even im-
agine McDonald's starting a franchise day-care business."3 6
King and Savas, as well as other publicists of privatization, sug-
gest that rolling dough and guarding inmates, flipping burgers and
raising children, all should be governed by the same set of princi-
ples. However, the Supreme Court expressly and repeatedly has re-
jected the premise that government operates like a private
corporation. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-
CIO v. McElro', Justice Potter Stewart held for the Court that "state
and federal governments, even in the exercise of their internal oper-
ations, do not constitutionally have the complete freedom of action
enjoyed by a private employer." 37 Both the Constitution and civil
service laws restrain the authority of the state as employer, and
these restrictions protect the public as well as its employees. Priva-
tization purports to promote efficiency, but only by stripping civil
servants of freedoms essential to the administration of democratic
government.
A. Civil Service Laws: Openness, Merit, and Independence
Justice William 0. Douglas termed the civil service system " 'the
one great political invention' of nineteenth century democracy."3' :
The Pendleton Act of 1883 first introduced a merit system into fed-
eral law, providing the basis for the current web of civil service regu-
lation.3 9 New York and Massachusetts adopted the merit principle
in 1883 and 1884, respectively, and seven other states followed by
34. Justice Burger's Work Ethic, Jericho 1, 8 (Winter 1981-82).
35. Mr. Savas was Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development until,
confusing public and private, he used his staff to type and proofread his book and
appointed a panel that awarded a contract to a firm that had paid him $33,000 in con-
sulting fees. Travel, Reimbursements and Perquisites, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1986, at
A12, col. 3 ; Inside: Housing and Urban Development, Wash. Post, July 18, 1983 at
All, col. 1.
36. E. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector 120 (1982).
37. 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961).
38. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 121 (1947) (Douglas,J., dissent-
ing in part) (quoting G. Wallas, Human Nature in Politics).
39. Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
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the close of World War 1.4 ° Today, the vast majority of federal em-
ployees are in the classified service, 4' and all states have adopted
some form of civil service system,4 2 many guaranteeing the merit
principle in their state constitutions. 4 3 By 1970, approximately 85%
of all public employees occupied classified positions. 44
1. Principles and Goals of Civil Service Laws Historians differ in
their assessments of the motives and accomplishments of early civil
service reforms. Some agree with Justice Douglas and root them in
a democratic impulse.4 5 Others find they were designed to ensure
government by an elite cadre of experts and thereby to curb urban
ward bosses and their immigrant constituencies. 46 Notwithstanding
the contradictory purposes in which they originated, however, civil
service laws now extend beyond an elite corps of public officials,
providing job security to secretaries, custodians, and garbage collec-
tors. Moreover, women and minorities have tended to find jobs in
the civil service more readily than in the private sector.4 7 Thus, the
significance of civil service principles in the late twentieth century
cannot necessarily be identified with the concerns animating the cre-
ation of the administrative state.
Today, civil service laws establish two central requirements:
(1) appointment and promotion must be in accord with merit and
fitness and (2) discharge may only be for just cause. These re-
straints not only prohibit the "spoils system," which awards jobs on
the basis of political fealty, 4 8 but also embody a set of positive prin-
ciples of public administration. These principles are openness,
40. W. Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform 35 (1952).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 2101 (1979).
42. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.01 (Anderson 1984).
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. 5, § 6.
44. Rustein, Survey of Current Personnel Systems in State and Local Governments,
88 Good Gov't 1, 2 (Spring 1970).
45. See, e.g., D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution 47-93 (1971); D.
Harvey, The Civil Service Commission 3-31 (1970).
46. See, e.g,J. Sproat, The Best Men (1968); A. Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
(1961); M. Josephson, The Politicos, 1865-1896 (1938); NI. Keller, Affairs of State 272-
75, 313-14 (1977). Dissenting in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), Justice Powell
summarized many of the arguments concerning the democratizing effects of a patronage
system. 427 U.S. at 379-87 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Ironically, given business' current criticism of the inefficiency of the civil service sys-
tem, the National Manufacturers' Association once endorsed civil service reforms,
resolving in 1868 that it was "indispensable that public affairs be conducted on business
principles." Resolution of May 27, 1868, quoted in W. Nelson, The Roots of American
Bureaucracy 120 (1982).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
48. Indeed, if this were the sole purpose of civil service laws, they would have been
rendered largely superfluous by Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), which held that
patronage dismissals trespass on the first amendment.
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merit, and independence. Privatization of public services is incom-
patible with each of these ideals.
Civil service laws guarantee that vacancies in government are pub-
licly announced, qualifications are clearly articulated, application is
open to all, and selection is according to objective criteria. The
commitment to openness in the civil service is designed to ensure
that it will be representative of the electorate. Although merit is
difficult to define and harder to measure, the system of examina-
tions and qualification standards required by civil service laws pro-
vide some assurance that the public business is not delegated simply
to workers of a particular color, workers who have given something
in return, or workers willing to accept the lowest wage. Private con-
tractors are barred from engaging in certain types of discrimination,
but they remain relatively free to hire through a closed and private
process. It is not surprising, therefore, that government service
opened an avenue to secure and well-paying jobs for women and
minorities, while the doors to the corporate boardroom remain
closed.
In 1980, 27.1% of black workers were employed by government,
as compared with 15.9% of white employees. Black employment in
the public sector is even more pronounced at the higher levels of
government. Fifty-three percent of all black managers and profes-
sionals are in the public service in contrast to only 29% of whites. 49
Similarly, women have found unique opportunities in government
service. Only 16% of working men are employed in government,
while 21% of working women are employed there. Fifty-five per-
cent of all female professionals are civil servants, compared with
only 35% of male professionals. 50 Public employees, then, are more
49. Joint Center for Political Studies, Alternative Service Delivery Systems: Implica-
tions for Minority Economic Advancement, Report Submitted to Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development 4 (Apr. 1985). The introduction of a merit system into the federal
service in 1883 led to a marked increase in black employment by 1892. See S. Krislov,
The Negro in Federal Employment 19 (1967).
50. Dantico & Jurik, Where Have All the Good Jobs Gone? The Effect of Govern-
ment Service Privatization on Women Workers, 10 Contemp. Crises 421, 426 (1986).
Women and minorities also are better paid in government than they are in the private
sector. Adjusting for skill, the federal government pays white women 20% more than
private industry. Minority women are paid 30% more. Id. at 426. In addition, unions of
public workers represent a high percentage of women and minorities. For example the
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO is 51% female
and 17% black. Interview with William Wilkinson, Labor Economist/Information Spe-
cialist, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, March
8, 1988. Correspondingly, these unions have always been in the forefront of the struggle
for equal employment opportunity. The United Federal Workers of America, CIO,
formed in 1937, was the first national union to be headed by a woman, Eleanor Nelson.
Hanson, United Public Workers: A Real Union Organizes, in The Cold War Against
Labor, Vol. I, 172, 175-76 (A. Ginger & D. Christiano, eds. 1987). After the Federal
Vol. 6:88, 1988
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representative of both the racial and gender composition of the
workforce than are employees in private business.
Because the civil service does not simply execute, but also inter-
prets and initiates policy, this "representative bureaucracy" is a crit-
ical element of a functioning democracy. 5' According to political
scientist Norton Long, "the bureaucracy is not just an instrument to
carry out a will formed by the elected Congress and President. It is
itself a medium for registering the diverse wills that make up the
people's will and for transmuting them into responsible . . . public
policy." 52 Furthermore, the composition of the civil service "sym-
bolize[s] values and power realities" and thereby influences prac-
tices in private business. 53 When federal agencies, for example,
segregated black and white employees under presidents William
Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson, segregation in housing, em-
ployment, and public accommodations also increased notably in the
District of Columbia. 54 Consequently, it is a profoundly disturbing
sign that Equal Employment Opportunity officers in many federal
agencies have already witnessed an adverse impact on minority em-
ployment resulting from contracting-out. 55 A recent study of priva-
tization's effect on women workers suggests that because of greater
subjectivity in hiring and promotion procedures, privatization may
contribute to a stabilization or increase in the gender, racial, and
ethnic segregation of occupations.56
Workers and the State, County and Municipal Workers, CIO merged to form the United
Public Workers of America, CIO, at a 1946 convention in Atlantic City, NewJersey, the
leaders of the new union went out to celebrate at a local restaurant. When the manager
of the establishment refused to seat the black members of the party, a picket line was
formed, resulting in the arrest of 32 leaders of the newly formed UPWA. Id. at 172. The
UFWA and its successor the UPWA were instrumental in prodding the newly established
Fair Employment Practices Commission to rid the federal government ofJim Crow. Id.
at 177-88, 389-91. Today, the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees. AFL-CIO is a leading advocate of equal pay for women performing jobs of
"comparable worth" to those performed by men. See, e.g., American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
51. J. Donald Kingsley coined this term in Representative Bureaucracy (1944). See
also S. Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy (1974).
52. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 808, 810 (1952).
Long goes so far as to argue that the civil service is "more responsive to the desires and
needs of the broad public than [legislators] whose responsiveness is enforced by a mech-
anism of elections that frequently places more power in the hands of campaign-backers
than voters." Id. at 813. But see Subramaniam, Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassess-
ment, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1010 (1967).
53. S. Krislov, The Negro in Federal Employment, supra note 49, at 64.
54. National Comm. on Segregation in The Nation's Capitol, Segregation in Wash-
ington 62 (1948).
55. Administration Contracting Plans Seen Already Hurting Minorities, Handi-
capped, 21 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1948-49 (Oct. 3, 1983).
56. Dantico &Jurik, supra note 50, at 429.
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Once hired, public employees acquire job security under civil ser-
vice laws and therefore a degree of independence. Civil servants
can be terminated or otherwise disciplined only for just cause, that
is, only for misconduct affecting their job performance; they do not
serve at the pleasure of their employers. In theory, such indepen-
dence promotes fidelity to law rather than loyalty to superiors. A
civil servant cannot be discharged for insubordination based on his
or her refusal to obey an unlawful order. The civil service system
thus fortifies the democratic process, guaranteeing that changes in
public policy can be secured solely through legislative action rather
than by altering the identity of those who administer the laws. In
the private sector, however, most employees may be discharged at
their employer's will,5 7 with the exception of those covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements. 58 Two centuries ago, Thomas Jeffer-
son pointed out that, "[d]ependence begets subservience and
venality," impairing the "vigour" necessary to republican govern-
ment. 5t Since the discretion of workers in private business may be
compromised by the insecurity of their employment, they are no
substitute for an independent civil service.
The tension between privatization and the civil service system is
reflected in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No.
A-76, the leading statement of federal support for privatization.
The "general policy" of the federal government, according to the
OMB circular, is "to rely on commercial sources to supply the prod-
ucts and services the Government needs."' 60 Yet the circular also
states that contracting-out will not be used to "justify departure from
[civil service] law[s] or regulation[s] . . . [or] for the purpose of
avoiding established salary or personnel limitations." 6' These
stated intentions-diverting public functions to commercial enter-
57. Approximately 21% of private sector employees were union members in 1980.
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1772, n.4 (1983).
58. Although exceptions to the employment-at-will rule are developing in many ju-
risdictions, most unrepresented workers in the private sector can still be fired for any
reason not specifically prohibited by law or for no reason at all. See generally W. Holloway
& M. I.eech, Employment Termination (1985); H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law
and Practice (1984); L. Larson, Unjust Dismissal (1987).
59. T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 165 (W. Peden ed. 1954). Jefferson
was concerned with the link between ownership of property and the rights of citizenship.
In an age in which "more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status
rather than of tangible goods," however, Charles Reich more recently argued, it is nec-
essary to create a "new property" consisting of enforceable rights and entitlements-
such as those contained in civil service laws-to fulfill the function once fulfilled by
Iropert' and to safeguard the independence and integrity of individual citizens and
public servants. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 738, 787 (1964).
60. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-76, § 4 (rev. Aug. 16, 1983).
61. Id. at § 7(b)(6).
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prise while also safeguarding civil service regulations-are plainly
inconsistent.
2. Civil Service Law v. Privatization in the Courts The conflict be-
tween privatization and civil service law has been carried to the
courtroom and underscored in several key rulings. In 1937, in one
of the earliest cases, the California Supreme Court refused to com-
pel the state comptroller to compensate an attorney who repre-
sented a state agency under contract.62 The court found the
contract inconsistent with the guarantee of a civil service system
contained in the state constitution as well as with the statute creat-
ing the system.63 Holding that the civil service provisions were
"comprehensive" and meant to apply to every state employee not
expressly exempted, 64 the court concluded:
There undoubtedly is a field in which state agencies may enter into
contract with independent contractors. But the true test is, not whether
the person is an "independent contractor" or an "employee," but
whether the services contracted for, whether temporary or permanent, are of such a
nature that they could be performed by one selected under the provisions of civil
service. If the services could be so performed, then in our opinion it is
mandatory upon such appointing power to proceed in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution and statute .... Any other construc-
tion of the constitutional provision would have the effect of weaken-
ing, if not destroying, the purpose and effect of the provision. 65
The inconsistency between privatization and civil service require-
ments was recognized in the late 1970s by the Washington Supreme
Court.6 6 In Washington State Federation of State Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Spokane Community College, the court held that a community college's
contract for custodial services "directly contravene[d]" the "basic
'policy and purpose" of the state's Higher Education Personnel
Law.6 7 While accepting the college's contention that its plan would
cut costs, the court countered that "the civil service laws embody a
determination that the interests of the state are best served by a sys-
tem of merit selection of personnel" 68 and that "[a]n anticipated or
real savings in cost cannot be a basis for avoiding the policy and
62. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Riley, 69 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1937).
63. 69 P.2d at 989.
64. 69 P.2d at 989.
65. 69 P.2d at 989 (emphasis added). Accord Burum v. State Compensation Ins.
Fund, 184 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1947); Stockburger v. Riley, 68 P.2d 741 (Cal. App. 1937).
66. Washington Federation of State Employees, AFL-CIO v. Spokane Community
College, 585 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
67. 585 P.2d at 477.
68. 585 P.2d at 477-78.
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mandate of civil service laws." '61 Absent a "showing that civil ser-
vants could not provide ... [the] services," the contract was held to
be void. 70
Three years ago, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Ohio State
University could not impose a hiring freeze-reducing its classified
workforce by attrition-while simultaneously contracting for private
provision of services previously performed by civil servants. 7' Like
the Washington court, the Ohio court identified, but flatly rejected,
the economy rationale, finding instead that preserving the civil ser-
vice was of paramount public concern. "While it is true that the
university is seeking, and succeeding in, the cutting of costs by con-
tracting out custodial services, in so doing it is insidiously accom-
plishing another goal which is totally at odds with the purposes of
the civil service system." 72 Foreseeing the long-term effect of priva-
tization, the court predicted:
Slowly and inevitably, the civil service system is eroded and ultimately,
eradicated entirely. The result is that the university obtains a free
hand to let out all services on a contract by contract basis without any
moderation or restriction by the civil service system .... [T]he lauda-
ble purpose of the civil service system is sidestepped completely. 73
A civil service law treatise summarizes the principle embodied in
these holdings: The "general rule is that public services are to be
performed whenever practicable by public employees. Neither a
private individual nor a firm may be hired to perform the normal
and routine duties of a public agency. ' 74
69. 585 P.2d at 478.
70. 585 P.2d at 477.
71. Local 4501, Communications Workers of America v. Ohio State Univ., 466
N.E.2d 912 (Ohio 1984), modified, 494 N.E.2d 1082 (Ohio 1986).
72. 466 N.E.2d at 914.
73. 466 N.E.2d at 915. This holding .was subsequently limited in Communications
Workers of America (CWA), Local 4501 v. Ohio State University, 494 N.E.2d 1082
(Ohio 1986). In the latter case, the Court recognized that between the times the two
cases arose, Ohio's public employees had obtained the right to engage in collective bar-
gaining. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4117.01 et seq. (Anderson 1984) (effective Apr. 1,
1984). The court found the practice of contracting-out for services previously per-
formed by civil servants to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and that "[clivil ser-
vants, themselves, are thus in a position to 'protect' the civil service system at the
bargaining table." 494 N.E.2d at 1086. Based on this premise, the court limited its
prior holding to those "rare instances in which the civil service positions affected by the
hiring freeze are (or may be) filled by public employees who have no statutory right to
collective bargaining agreement." 494 N.E.2d at 1087.
74. H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service 98-99 (1958). See also Jack A. Parker & As-
soc. v. State, 454 So.2d 162, 164-66 (La. App. 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 538 (La.
1984) (upholding Civil Service Commission rule prohibiting contracts for services that
"could and should be performed by classified employees").
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Other courts, however, have attempted to accommodate govern-
ment administrators' keen interest in contracting for services within
the framework of civil service law. Such contracts violate civil ser-
vice laws, these courts have ruled, only if they involve functions ful-
filled by existing civil servants or result in replacement of such
employees. In California State Employees Association v. IVilliams,75 the
California Court of Appeal rejected a "nature of the services" test,
which holds contracts unlawful unless it can be shown that the tasks
could not be performed by civil service personnel, and instead en-
gaged in a "functional inquiry." 76 According to the court, contracts
for services are valid, "if the services cannot be adequately rendered
by an existing agency of the public entity or if they do not duplicate
functions of an existing agency." 77 The court thus held that civil ser-
vice laws do not restrict the means by which the state can perform a
new function. Civil service requirements, the court found, impose
"no demand for achieving expansions of state function exclusively
through the traditional modes of direct administration. ' 78 Civil ser-
vice law, the court continued, "compels expansion of civil service
with expansions of state agency structure but does not force expan-
sions of state agency structure to match expansions of state
function." 79
The court reached this equivocal accommodation only by finding
that the sole aim of a merit system is the "protection of the existing
civil service structure."80 The court denied that the state constitu-
tion's civil service provision sets forth "a principle of public admin-
istration" or "an organic blueprint for the structure of agencies
within the state's executive branch." a But the assumption that civil
service laws are designed simply to preserve the state in its existing
form is untenable. For as demonstrated above,8 2 the requirements
of a merit system plainly were intended to serve as the guiding prin-
ciples of public administration. Moreover, the laws contain no tem-
poral qualifications distinguishing existing positions from future
state functions. Civil service laws are indeed a "blueprint" for carry-
ing out the public's business whether old or new.
75. 7 Cal. App. 3d 390 (1970).
76. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 396-97.
77. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 397.
78. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 399.
79. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 397.
80. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 397. (emphasis added).
81. 7 Cal. App. 3d at 397-98.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59.
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Even more narrowly circumscribing the scope of civil service laws,
other courts have held that contracting for services transgresses the
laws only when it represents a direct attempt to "thwart" the civil
service system.8 3 These courts have required that in order to pre-
vent contracting-out, plaintiffs must come forward with proof of de-
fendants' "bad faith" or intent to "circumvent the purposes of the
civil service system" and reinstate the "spoils system."-8 4 According
to these courts, a public employer whose sole motive is economy
acts in "good faith. ' '8 5
Yet, in most instances, the efficiency gained through contracting-
out follows directly from escaping civil service restrictions. The
courts' unwillingness to recognize this fact is illustrated by University
of Nevada v. State of Nevada Employees Association.86 In this case, the
Nevada Supreme Court held that the university could contract for
food services if it acted "in good faith ... for substantial rather than
arbitrary or capricious reasons."'8 7 The court went on to specify that
"no such action can be justified by reference to supposed advan-
tages derived from eliminating tangible or intangible emoluments
which Nevada law intends classified state employees to have." 88
Having formulated this coherent test, however, the Nevada court
failed to apply it rigorously. Citing the private provider's "free
choice of methods" in all areas from employment practices to ac-
counting procedures, the court merely asserted that "eliminating
civil service status for employees" was not the primary motive be-
hind the contracting-out.89 The court made no real inquiry into the
relative importance of freeing the contractor from the restraints of
civil service law in achieving the economy that was the express justi-
fication for contracting-out.
All these efforts to square privatization with the principles of civil
service rely on an increasingly narrow construction of civil service
83. Sigall v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors, 345 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 1976) (state univer-
sity's contracting-out for certain custodial services does not thwart purposes of civil ser-
vice system).
84. 345 N.E.2d at 65. See also Sovine v. Teater, 353 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ohio App.
1976) (state acted in good faith when it leased public facility to private operator for
financial reasons). Cf. San Antonio v. Wallace, 338 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. 1960) (em-
ployer must produce evidence of economic justification for abolition of civil service
position).
85. 345 N.E.2d at 65. See also Michigan State Employees Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 367 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Mich. App. 1985) (economic motives are proof of good
faith); Moncrief v. Tate, 593 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1980) (same).
86. 520 P.2d 602 (Nev. 1974).
87. 520 P.2d at 606.
88. 520 P.2d at 607.
89. 520 P.2d at 605.
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laws-a construction entirely at odds with the public's interest in
civil service reform. Reading civil service laws to permit private par-
ties to perform public functions, courts have transformed the laws
from models of public adminstration into protections of the individ-
ual interests of particular office holders. According to Justice Floyd
V. Hicks, who dissented in Washington Federation of State Employees,
Washington's Higher Education Personnel Law protects only em-
ployees, not any "particular services or types of work."90 Civil ser-
vice law, Justice Hicks maintained, "merely regulates the manner in
which existing positions of employment are filled and governs the
promotion, transfer, and dismissal of employees once they have
been hired." 9' Civil service principles, other courts have held, gov-
ern the relationship between employees or prospective employees
and existing offices, but "[n]o provision [of civil service law] com-
mands that particular services to be rendered the state be per-
formed exclusively by civil service employees." 92 According to this
argument, civil service laws regulate only the distribution of public
offices and are indifferent to how the public's business is performed.
Only within this narrow and privatized vision of civil service reform
is contracting-out consistent with merit principles. But such an in-
terpretation completely disregards public interest in the civil
service.93
B. Constitutional Protections: Public Employees' Freedom to Speak
The independence of government workers is ratified by civil ser-
vice rules and is even more fundamentally grounded in the Consti-
tution. Precisely because the state is their employer, public
employees can exercise citizens' rights within the employment rela-
tionship; they carry their guarantees of speech, association, and due
process as a badge of employment, while those in the private sector
lose many of these constitutional entitlements at the threshold of
90. 585 P.2d at 479 (Hicks,J., dissenting).
91. 585 P.2d at 479.
92. Sigall, 345 N.E.2d at 64. See also Michigan State Employees Ass'n, 367 N.W.2d at
852; Beck v. Board of Educ., 52 N.Y.S.2d 712, 715 (App. Div. 1945), aff'd, 65 N.E.2d
426 (N.Y. 1946).
93. See Michigan State Employees Ass'n, 367 N.W.2d at 855 (Danholf, C.J., dissenting);
In re IFPTE Local 195, 443 A.2d 187, 206 (N.J. 1982) (O'Hern, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("it is clear that substitutional subcontracting conflicts with the
goal of maintaining democratic accountability in state government").
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the workplace. 't 4 Here again, privatization threatens to eradicate
immunities integral to government service . 5
In a series of cases beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education in
1968,'-)t the Supreme Court held that citizens cannot be compelled
to cede the rights of free speech and association in order to become
public workers. Nor can public employees be discharged or other-
wise disciplined for exercising these rights.9 7 In each case that af-
firmed this rule, the speech at issue was in no way divorced from the
employment relation, but, in fact, arose out of and concerned condi-
tions of employment. In Pickering, a teacher criticized a board of
education's allocation of funds.98 In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, a teacher
informed a radio station about an administration memorandum con-
cerning teachers' appearance. 99 Finally, in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, a teacher protested against employment
discrimination at her school. 00 In all three cases, the Court barred
the public employer from penalizing the employee's speech. These
cases establish the proposition that employees' rights as citizens
cannot be separated from their role as public servants. As Justice
William Brennan observed in a later dissent, "speech about 'the
manner in which government is operated or should be operated' is
an essential part of the communications necessary for self-
governance." 10 1
Nevertheless, in the recent case of Connick v. Meyers,10 2 the
Supreme Court circumscribed the first amendment rights of public
employees when their speech concerns "only internal office mat-
94. It must be acknowledged, however, that public employees lose rights outside the
employment relationship. Under the Hatch Act and parallel state laws, they are prohib-
ited from taking an active part in partisan political campaigns. See infra, note 116.
95. Under certain circumstances, it may be possible for employees of private provid-
ers of public services to argue that the action of their employer is "state action" subject
to the appropriate constitutional restraints. For example, if the private firm is fulfilling a
traditionally governmental function, such as guarding prisoners, it is clearly a state actor
and subject to suit as such. See Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D. Tex.
1984). But even in this situation, it is unclear whether the private operator is a state
actor only in relation to prisoners or also in relation to its employees. In any case, the
mere fact that a private firm contracts with the state to provide service does not subject it
to the constraints of the Constitution. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41
(1982).
96. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
97. See also Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Con-
sol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
98. 391 U.S. at 564-66.
99. 429 U.S. at 282.
100. 439U.S. at412-13.
101. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
102. 461 U.S. 139 (1983).
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ters."I" The Court justified its abrupt departure from Picketing, MIt.
Health', and Givhan by identifying a tension " 'between the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.' "14 But in Connick, the tension between citizens' rights
and their role as employees was overdrawn, for the Court misread
the nature of the employment relation in the public sector. In a re-
publican polity the employer is neither District Attorney Connick
nor even the governor, but ultimately the populace in its sovereign
capacity. Efficiency, therefore, cannot be measured solely by re-
duced costs or increased discipline, but must also register whether
'civil servants carry out the public's will. Which is why public em-
ployees' free speech is not only an entitlement of citizenship, but
also required by their role as public servants.
Public employees play a pivotal part in informing citizens about
government institutions and services. Consumers, in contrast to cit-
izens, can ordinarily judge the quality and value of goods and serv-
ices in the market without directly communicating with producers of
the commodities. The buyer is usually the consumer, the purchase
is usually for immediate consumption, and, in theory, consumer de-
mand may be relied on to drive the market.' 0 5
But government does not operate by the rules of the market. In
many cases, citizens who purchase government services-taxpay-
ers-are not the consumers of those services. For example, constit-
uents may require that state government provide humane care and
treatment to the mentally ill, but only the mentally ill will actually
receive these services. And in this case, as in many others concern-
ing social services, the recipients may lack effective means to advise
the public about the quality of services they receive. Where govern-
ment services are provided to a disabled or relatively inarticulate
sector of the population, often remote from public view, as in pris-
ons or hospitals, it is critical that providers of services be free to
communicate directly with citizens.
103. 461 U.S. at 143.
104. 461 U.S. at 140 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
105. This simple model of the market ignores the importance of private employees'
exposing social costs of production that do not register in the price paid by the con-
sumer, such as pollution, and providing information to the consumer that is neither
evident on the face of the commodity nor trumpeted through advertising, such as data
on design defects that pose a risk to safety.
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Even when the public at large gains from a government service,
the broad diffusion of the benefit often renders individual citizens
unable to gauge its quality. National defense is the classic "collec-
tive good," io6 but individuals cannot as easily evaluate whether their
tax dollars are being spent wisely at the Pentagon as they can deter-
mine the quality and value of a hammer. Public employees are
uniquely situated to inform voters on such matters of public con-
cern. "Teachers," for example, "are, as a class, the members of a
community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to
how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent,"
observed Justice Thurgood Marshall in Picketing.'0 7 "Accordingly, it
is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions
without fear of retaliatory dismissal."108
Beyond performing assigned tasks, the role of civil servants en-
tails participating in and informing public discussion about the goals
of public policy and the practical means of achieving them. Accord-
ing to Justice Felix Frankfurter, restraints on public employees'
rights are "not merely unjustifiable restraints on individuals," they
produce "an atmosphere of repression uncongenial to the spiritual
vitality of a democratic society."' 0 9 Such inhibitions, Frankfurter
maintained, "are hostile to the best conditions for securing a high-
minded and high-spirited public service." 110
Although enforcing legal rights is an uncertain, expensive, and
protracted remedy for the swift and palpable retaliatory actions of
government managers, it nevertheless gives conscientious public
employees a degree of protection not afforded their counterparts in
private industry. In 1969, for example, an employee of the Air
Force, Ernest Fitzgerald, testified before Congress about huge cost
overruns in the development of the C-5A transport plane. After
Fitzgerald was isolated, assigned new duties, and finally dismissed,
he sought redress before the Civil Service Commission and in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where 11
years later he was ordered reinstated to his original position.'"
When "privatized," however, free speech can more easily be desig-
106. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 14 (1968).
107. 391 U.S. at 563.
108. 391 U.S. at 572.
109. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 728 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
110. 341 U.S. at 728.
111. Glazer & Glazer, The Whistle Blower's Plight, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1986, at
A22, col. 1; Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 545 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1982).
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nated insubordination or disloyalty.' '- In the absence of clear con-
stitutional protections, relatively few employees who speak out in
the private sector retain their jobs. A study of 55 whistleblowers in
both government and private industry found that not one of the in-
dustrial whistleblowers survived on the job, " 3 Another study found
that many whistleblowers also have been blacklisted in the corporate
world." l4 Given the enormous power of the modern state, democ-
racy cannot afford to delegate public authority to private businesses
whose employees lack constitutional protection when they under-
take to expose abuses of that authority.
By severing civil servants' direct links to the state, advocates of
privatization propose to cure bureaucracy of its supposed defects. It
is in the private sector, however, where constitutional guarantees
and principles of citizenship exert no countervailing influence, that
employers can readily introduce hierarchical systems of discipline-
especially when workers remain unorganized. The objective of
privatization, then, is the quintessence of bureaucracy: administra-
tive personnel cut off from public discussion, who execute assigned
tasks without attending to their social consequences.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,' 15 Justice Douglas declared in dissent
that "[a] bureaucracy that is alert, vigilant, and alive is more efficient
than one that is quiet and submissive. It is the First Amendment
that makes it alert, vigilant, and alive. It is suppression of First
Amendment rights that creates faceless, nameless bureaucrats who
are inert in their localities and submissive to some master's
voice."" 16 Privatization distances the state from the individuals who
actually perform the mundane tasks of government. Dissolving the
connection between citizen and employee, privatization threatens to
replace the civil service with the ranks of "faceless, nameless" ser-
112. Even jurisdictions that have recognized a "public policy" exception to the em-
ployment-at-will rule rarely extend protection to employees who report wrongdoing to
company officials or to the public. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp.. 830 F.2d
1303 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim of employee who was discharged after he advised
superiors he would report kickbacks to headquarters).
113. Glazer & Glazer, supra note I 11.
114. A. Westin, Whistle Blowing 3 (1981).
115. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
116. 413 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The first amendment rights of most
public employees are, however, sharply restricted by the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-
7327 (1980) or "little Hatch Acts" enacted by states and localities, such as the Oklahoma
law at issue in Broadrick, which prohibit active involvement in partisan politics. There
have been repeated efforts to lift these restraints. The House of Representatives re-
cently approved legislation which would amend the Hatch Act to eliminate virtually all
restriction on off-duty political activity. House Votes to Loosen Hatch Act, Wash. Post,
Nov. 18, 1987, at AI, col. 5.
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vants that Justice Douglas found corrosive to democratic
government.
Conclusion
Without challenging the assertion that privatization will reduce
the costs of governing, this Article nevertheless questions the legal
and political consequences of diverting public tasks to private
hands. As the size and function of government have expanded dur-
ing the last century, public employees have won rights in their work-
place. Derived from civil service laws and constitutional guarantees,
these rights neither vest public servants with a form of private prop-
erty in their jobs nor simply protect their individual interests as citi-
zens against the state; rather, these rights are integral to carrying
out public policy. Both by definition and design, privatization elimi-
nates the direct relation between civil servants and the state and
thereby destroys entitlements of public employment that are essen-
tial to democratic government.
Privatization seeks to substitute the discipline of the market for
these legal and political ties. But the market's animating principle is
competition, which drives capital to seek the cheapest set of hands,
whether located across state lines or foreign borders. Carried to its
logical conclusion, then, the argument for privatization implies that
tax refunds may soon be calculated in South Korea and city
purchase orders processed in the Philippines. When coupled with
the strategy of the runaway shop, the trend toward privatization may
as easily detach public service from citizenship as unfasten the links
between civil servants and the state.
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